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PREVENTIVE DETENTION: United States v. 
Salerno* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our constitutional form of government is a delicate balance be-
tween two important principles: the protection of individual liberty 
interests and the preservation of society as a whole. United States v. 
Salerno1 represents a confrontation between these two principles. 
The 1984 Bail Reform Act favors the preservation of society by 
detaining, without bail, arrestees posing a threat to the safety of the 
community.2 The Supreme Court recently considered the constitu-
tionality of the Act in United States v. Salerno.3 The Court upheld 
the pretrial detention of dangerous arrestees, finding that pretrial 
detention constituted a permissible governmental regulation and, 
therefore, the Act did not violate the fifth or eighth amendments to 
the Constitution.4 
This Note will examine three topics. First, it will discuss the pro-
visions and the legislative history of the 1984 Bail Reform Act. Sec-
ond, it will discuss why the Act withstood constitutional challenge 
in Salerno. Third, it will address the constitutional issues raised by 
the lack of a specific limitation on the length of detention. 
I I . BACKGROUND 
A. Provisions of the 1984 Bail Reform Act 
The 1984 Bail Reform Act requires pretrial detention for ar-
restees charged with certain serious felonies when "no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any 
other person and the community . . . Pretrial detention is availa-
ble in two situations: (1) when the arrestee has previously commit-
ted a specific offense while on release awaiting trial; and (2) when 
there is probable cause to believe that an arrestee, whose appear-
ance at trial cannot be assured, has committed a major drug traf-
ficking offense or a felony with a firearm.6 
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In cases where the detention presumption arises, the court must 
hold a hearing at which a judicial official decides whether or not to 
detain the arrestee. Such a hearing must be held at the arrestee's 
first appearance.7 At the detention hearing, the arrestee is entitled 
to the assistance of counsel, may testify, present or proffer evidence 
in his behalf, and may cross examine the Government's witnesses.8 
The judge's discretion in these hearings is limited to consideration 
of the following statutory factors: the nature and seriousness of the 
charges, the substance of the Government's evidence against the ar-
restee, the arrestee's background and character, and the nature and 
seriousness of the danger posed by the arrestee's release.8 The Gov-
ernment must prove by clear and convincing evidence that releasing 
the arrestee would create a danger to the community.10 A detention 
order must be in writing and state the reasons for detention.11 Fol-
lowing a pretrial detention order, an arrestee is entitled to an expe-
dited appeal.12 
B. The Legislative History 
The legislative history of the 1984 Bail Reform Act reveals that 
Congress intended the Act to respond to a pressing social problem 
— the consequences of recidivism among arrestees released on 
bail.13 In drafting the Act, Congress sought to respond conscien-
tiously to the problem without exceeding the bounds of permissible 
regulation.14 
Specifically, Congress intended to limit the scope of the Act by 
covering only "a small but identifiable group of particularly danger-
ous defendants," namely organized crime members, terrorists and 
narcotics traffickers.15 Congress also indicated an intent to expressly 
limit the length of time an arrestee could be detained.16 Some sena-
tors expressed a desire that detention be limited to an absolute 
ninety days.17 Others wanted a sixty day limit with certain excluda-
ble time provisions.18 The final version of the Act did not, however, 
contain a specific time limit.19 
Congress also indicated that it intended to enact a permissible 
regulation that would not violate the due process rights of an arres-
7 Id. at § 3142(0-
8 Id. 
9 Id. at § 3142(g). 
10 Id. at § 3142(0-
11 Id. at § 3142(i). 
12 Id. at §§ 3142(b), (c). 
13 S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 3183, 3185-3186. 
14 Id. 
16 Id. 
16 130 CONG. REC. S941-45 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984). 
17 Id. at S941-45 (statements of Senators Thurmond, Laxalt and Grassley). 
18 Id. at S941, S945 (statements of Senators Specter and Mitchell). 
18 The Courts have interpreted the pretrial detention provisions as being subject to the 
ninety day provision of the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 100-
101 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.). 
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tee.20 Consequently, the Act includes several specific procedural 
safeguards.21 
III. United States v. Salerno 
A. Facts and Case History 
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested pursuant to 
an indictment charging twenty-nine counts of violating the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The indictment al-
leged thirty-five specific acts of racketeering, including mail and 
wire fraud, extortion, and conspiracy to commit murder. A pretrial 
detention hearing was held in the district court. The Government 
conceded that neither defendant posed a risk of flight, but con-
tended that no condition of bail would assure the safety of the com-
munity. The Government presented a lengthy proffer of evidence 
which indicated that Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese crime 
family and Cafaro was his "captain." Two Government witnesses 
testified that Salerno had personally participated in murder conspir-
acies. Salerno opposed detention without bail by challenging the 
credibility of the Government's witnesses and offering a letter from 
his doctor stating that Salerno suffered from a serious medical con-
dition. Cafaro responded that the Government's evidence was 
merely "tough talk."22 
The district court granted the Government's motion for deten-
tion, concluding that the Government had established by clear and 
convincing evidence that no condition of bail would ensure the 
safety of the community. The court noted the serious nature of both 
defendants' involvement in organized crime and the resulting pre-
sent danger to the community. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, however, held the 1984 Bail Reform Act unconstitutional. 
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Second Circuit.23 
B. United States Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the pre-
trial detention provisions of the 1984 Bail Reform Act under the 
fifth and eighth amendments to the Constitution. The Court held 
that when governmental interests are compelling and the procedural 
safeguards are sufficient, detention on the grounds of dangerousness 
does not violate the fifth amendment. The Court also rejected the 
20 S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
N E W S 3182 . 
21 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 . 
22 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2099. 
23 Id. at 2098-100. 
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eighth amendment challenge, holding that there is no absolute right 
to bail and that the eighth amendment does not prohibit the govern-
ment from pursuing other compelling interests through the regula-
tion of pretrial release. 
1. Fifth Amendment Due Process 
The Court first found that the Act survived a facial challenge 
under the fifth amendment due process clause.24 The Court rea-
soned that incarceration does not necessarily imply punishment be-
cause the government's regulatory interest can at times outweigh an 
individual's liberty interest.26 The Act, the Court reasoned, meets 
the criteria for proper governmental regulation of an individual's 
liberty.26 Specifically, the Court found the Act responsive to a legit-
imate societal problem of criminal recidivism by those free on bond 
awaiting trial.27 The Court further found that pretrial detention 
with careful procedural safeguards is not an excessive response to 
the problem.28 
The Court cited precedent in which the governmental interest in 
regulation outweighed the liberty interest of an individual.29 For ex-
ample, dangerous individuals may be detained in times of war;30 
aliens awaiting deportation may be detained if they are danger-
ous;31 the government may detain the mentally ill who pose a dan-
ger to the community;32 the government may detain dangerous 
juveniles;33 competent adults may be detained following arrest while 
awaiting a judicial determination of probable cause;34 and, finally, 
arrestees may be incarcerated until trial if they present a risk of 
flight or may endanger a witness.36 Considering these numerous ex-
amples, the Court concluded that detention on the ground of dan-
gerousness to the community was not particularly novel.36 Thus, the 
Court held when governmental interests are compelling and the 
procedural safeguards are sufficient, detention on the ground of 
dangerousness does not violate the fifth amendment.37 
2. Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail 
The Court also considered the pretrial detention provisions of the 
Act under the eighth amendment to the Constitution, which pro-
24 Id. at 2101. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. (•citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). 
27 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 2102. 
30 Id. (citing Ludecke v. Wadkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948)). 
31 Id. (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1979)). 
32 Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). 
33 Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)). 
34 Id. (,citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1979)). 
36 Id. {citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). 
36 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2102. 
37 Id. at 2104. 
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vides that "excessive bail shall not be required."38 The defendants 
in Salerno contended that the purpose of bail is to ensure the ap-
pearance of the accused at trial and that bail could only be denied 
if the accused would not appear. Congress, the defendants argued, 
had no authority to define other situations in which bail could be 
denied.39 
The Court rejected the defendants' eighth amendment challenge, 
finding that there was nothing in the eighth amendment that pro-
vided an absolute right to bail.40 The Court also found nothing in 
the eighth amendment prohibiting the government from pursuing 
other compelling interests through the regulation of pretrial re-
lease.41 Since the defendants conceded the compelling purpose of 
the Act, the Court concluded that the Act did not violate the eighth 
amendment.42 
I V . ANALYSIS 
The Court's arguments supporting the constitutionality of pre-
trial detention are generally persuasive. Precedent exists for the 
regulation of an individual's liberty when there is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Exceptions are made to the right to bail when 
the integrity of the judicial system is threatened by the accused's 
risk of flight or danger to a witness. Danger to the community is 
certainly as compelling an interest as preservation of the judicial 
system.43 
The Court has recognized several exceptions to an individual's 
due process rights when the individual presents a danger to the 
community.44 The authorization of pretrial detention in the Bail 
Reform Act is another constitutionally valid exception. Infringe-
ment on the liberty interest of a competent adult, however, must be 
carefully limited by procedural safeguards. The Act provides such 
safeguards at the detention hearing by allowing the accused the 
right to counsel, to testify on his own behalf, and to cross-examine 
government witnesses45 The judge's discretion is limited and the 
government must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evi-
dence.46 These procedural safeguards are more stringent than those 
found in other constitutionally valid pretrial or dangerousness-based 
38 Id. (citing U.S. CONST, amend. VIII.). 
39 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2104. 
40 Id. at 2104-05. 
41 Id. at 2104. 
42 Id. at 2105. 
43 Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pre-trial Detention, 55 VA. L. 
REV. 1223 (1969). 
44 See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
46 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)-
46 Id. 
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detentions.47 
The Court, however, does not clearly address the argument that 
the presumption of innocence is offended by the pretrial detention 
provisions of the Act. Although the Act has been criticized for un-
duly relying on an indictment to rebut the presumption of inno-
cence,48 the indictment's importance in determining detention with-
out bail is limited and not unprecedented. Furthermore, the Act 
requires courts to consider several other factors in determining 
whether pretrial detention is proper, such as the strength of the ac-
tual evidence against an arrestee, the seriousness of prior convic-
tions, the background and character of the arrestee, and the precise 
danger that the arrestee's release poses.49 The indictment, therefore, 
is not the only factor used to support pretrial detention. Instead, it 
acts more as a threshold condition that gives the government juris-
diction over the individual. Furthermore, it creates a judicial duty 
not to release those properly in custody who pose a clear threat to 
the safety of the community. Because the indictment plays a lim-
ited role in determining the propriety of pretrial detention, any 
threat to the presumption of innocence is limited. 
Moreover, consideration of the seriousness of the charges against 
an arrestee as a factor in denying bail is not unprecedented. Courts 
consider the charges against an arrestee when bail is denied on the 
grounds that the arrestee poses a risk of flight.50 Thus, the use of 
the indictment under the Act is no greater threat to the presump-
tion of innocence than already exists. 
Although the strict procedural safeguards of the Act are gener-
ally adequate to insure due process, and its limited reliance on the 
indictment does not offend the presumption of innocence, the Act 
does lack one important safeguard. It does not limit the length of 
time an arrestee may be incarcerated while awaiting trial. The 
courts have interpreted the pretrial detention provisions as being 
limited only by the Speedy Trial Act.51 The Speedy Trial Act, how-
ever, has been ineffective in protecting an arrestee from excessive 
incarceration.52 Under the pretrial detention provisions of the Act, 
arrestees have been incarcerated for four,53 six,54 eight,55 and six-
teen months56 while awaiting trial. Such lengthy detention is incon-
sistent with constitutional standards for permissible governmental 
regulation. 
Proper governmental regulation must not be so excessive as to 
47 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
48 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2107 (Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). 
40 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
60 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951). 
61 See supra note 22. 
52 United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 996 (2d Cir. 1986). 
63 United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (2d Cir. 1986). 
64 United States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). 
58 Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 996. 
86 United States v. Zannio, 798 F.2d 544, 548-49 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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constitute punishment.57 Pretrial incarceration for as long as eight 
months has been held to constitute punishment.58 Consequently, in 
the absence of a clear limitation on the length of incarceration, ar-
restees may be detained under the Act for unconstitutionally long 
periods. 
Moreover, lengthy incarceration is inconsistent with Congres-
sional intent. The record of debate indicates discussion of both a 
sixty and ninety day time limit.59 In fact, the length of time ar-
restees are being held while awaiting trial is well beyond either of 
the limits contemplated by Congress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Salerno, the Court rejected fifth and eighth 
amendment challenges to the constitutionality of the 1984 Bail Re-
form Act. The Court, however, did not address the fact that the 
Act may permit arrestees to be detained for unconstitutionally long 
periods of time. The Speedy Trial Act, which courts have inter-
preted as governing the length of incarceration, provides a ninety 
day limit with provisions for excludable time. Under the provisions 
for excludable time, however, arrestees have been held as long as 
sixteen months while awaiting trial. 
Case-by-case adjudication of the limits of Bail Reform Act de-
tention will only further lengthen the criminal justice process. 
Amending the Act to provide a sixty or ninety day absolute limit 
would further the Congressional intent and ensure a "bright line" 
test for determining the proper length of pretrial detention. The 
Act, therefore, should be amended to include an absolute time limit 
on the length of detention. 
67 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979). 
58 Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). 
s9 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. Apparently, the Act lacks a time limit 
provision because Congress failed to reach a consensus on the length of detention. 
